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We consider a model of wage formation characterized by two fea-
tures: learning and downward rigidity. We show that wages should
exhibit a late-beginner property: when one controls for the wage
at date t, the wage at date t ￿ 1 should be negatively correlated
with the wage at date t ￿ 1. We test this property on a sample of
about 1,000 executives of a French state-owned firm whose careers
we observe for 15 years. This organization exhibits the features that
characterize internal labor markets; in particular, careers consist
of sequences of discrete promotions, a fact that generates specific
econometric problems. The results confirm the prediction.
I. Introduction
Most quantitative predictions of contract theory bear on the relation-
ship between outcomes (‘‘performances’’) and monetary transfers.
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In the case of labor contracts, different sets of assumptions about
the information structure generate different conclusions about how
wages depend on the worker’s ‘‘performance,’’ as defined by some
adequate index. In principle, such predictions are empirically test-
able. A major source of difficulty, however, lies in the fact that, in
many situations, performance, although observed by the employer,
is not available to the econometrician.1 In most cases, indeed, data
sets contain information only on wage or career profiles, plus a few
worker-specific characteristics (age, training, etc.). In such cases, the
static predictions of the models can turn out to be quite difficult to
test.
In order to overcome the lack of performance proxies, a natural
solution is to turn to dynamics and to derive, from the various theo-
retical explanations at stake, different implications for the random
process followed through time by wages or promotions. Instead of
focusing attention, as usual, on the way wages at date t depend on
performances at the same period, we may, in other words, concen-
trate on the way wages at time t depend on wages at time t ￿ 1 and
before. For empirical investigations of this kind, data on perfor-
mances or individual outcomes are no longer necessary. What is
needed is simply a record of wage profiles plus, of course, a theoreti-
cal characterization of the dynamic properties of wages.
The main objective of this paper is to provide an illustration of
this general research direction. We consider a class of models that
is characterized by two features: the employer and the worker simul-
taneously learn about the worker’s ability from the observation of
his or her performance, and wages are downwardly rigid.
From now on, we shall refer to this class as the LDR (for learning
and downward rigidity) models. The class includes in particular the
model of insurance and Bayesian learning proposed by Harris and
Holmstrom (1982). In this framework, downward rigidity arises be-
cause wage contracts are used to share the risk in an optimal way,
under the constraint that the employee is always free to quit. An
alternative explanation of wage rigidity relies on incomplete con-
tracting (as in MacLeod and Malcomson [1993]). Also, downward
rigidity is a standard finding of the empirical literature on wage set-
ting (see, e.g., the recent study by Bewley [1997]).
Our test is based on a characteristic property of wage dynamics
1 An important exception is Murphy’s (1986) investigation of a longitudinal sam-
ple of 1,488 chief executive officers spanning more than 1,000 firms. Murphy’s idea
is to use the rate of return on common stock as a measure of the executive’s perfor-
mance. In a similar way, Farber and Gibbons (1991) study the correlation through
time between wages and proxies of ability.
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that we call the late-beginner effect . Consider two workers who start
from the same wage level at date 0 and receive exactly the same wage
at date 2. However, they have followed a different path between
dates 0 and 2. Worker A is an early starter, in the sense that her wage
at date 1 is high, and B is a late beginner, with a lower salary at date
1. We show that, in the LDR framework, B’s future career prospects
then are better than A’s. In other words, if we control for the wage
at date 2, then the wage at date 1 should be negatively correlated with
future wages (at date 3 and beyond). As this property concerns only
the time process followed by wages, it can be tested even if perfor-
mances have not been recorded.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the construction and estima-
tion of an econometric model aimed at testing this prediction. We
estimate the model on a data set in which the careers of a panel of
about 1,000 executives of a French state-owned firm are recorded
for 15 years.2
A characteristic of this firm is that it provides a typical example
of an internal labor market (see Doeringer and Piore 1971). This is
a useful feature since we believe that LDR models provide especially
accurate descriptions of internal labor markets, if only because their
oversimplified representation of competition on the (external) la-
bor market does not raise major problems in this case, as it would
in a more ‘‘open’’ type of organization.3 However, using data from
an internal labor market has some drawbacks. Within an internal
labor market, wages are, in general, determined by the hierarchical
level and seniority, according to some explicit formula (which has
generally been negotiated with unions). Thus promotions should be
seen as the appropriate index to appraise the link between compen-
sation and performances, a point already emphasized by Baker et al.
(1994b) and Bewley (1997). In the empirical part, we shall therefore
consider a model in which the dependent variable is qualitative; this
raises specific econometric problems.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we summarize the
main features of the model we consider and provide restrictions on
compensation dynamics that lead to a testable property of the wage
process. A brief description of the data is given in Section III. Some
preliminary statistics are computed in Section IV. Section V is de-
2 We believe that, as argued in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a), for this
purpose, longitudinal monographic data relative to a given firm should be preferred
to cross-section samples gathering workers from many firms and involving all kinds
of hierarchical levels.
3 In particular, the wage rigidity assumption is much more likely to hold for agents
remaining within the same firm than for agents who change jobs (see Bils 1985).
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voted to the econometric model, whose estimation results are pre-
sented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII considers some alternative
explanations for the late-beginner effect.
II. The Theoretical Model
A. The Basic Framework
The class of models for which our approach is relevant is character-
ized by two features. On the one hand, the labor relationship entails
learning on the worker’s ability. On the other hand, the wage pro-
cess exhibits a downward rigidity property: the wage at date t must
depend on the employer’s beliefs but also be bounded below by
some function of the wage at date t ￿ 1.
These two requirements can be formalized as follows.
1. Learning
Our representation of the learning process exactly follows that of
Harris and Holmstrom (1982) in their seminal paper. Information
is incomplete but symmetric between the employer and the employ-
ees. To capture this feature, it is assumed that each employee i is
characterized by, besides observable variables (education etc.), a
(scalar) ability index ηi. At the beginning of the relationship, the
worker’s ability is unknown to both parties . They know only the distri-
bution from which η i is drawn; we assume that this distribution is
normal.
During the relationship, both parties learn (symmetrically) about
ηi. Specifically, at each period t, the employee’s performance y it is
publicly revealed. Performance is a noisy function of the employee’s
ability.
Assumption 1. Performance at date t is given by y it ￿ ηi ￿ ￿ it ,
where the ￿ it are independently and identically distributed centered
normal random shocks.
Given the current observation, both parties revise their perception
of the worker’s ability in a Bayesian way; we call mit the posterior
beliefs at date t . A basic property of this setting, which will be crucial
below, is given by the following easy lemma.
Lemma 1. Under assumption 1, the posterior distribution of
mit￿1, conditional on y i1, . . . , y it , depends only on mit and on the
parameters of the model. Moreover, it is increasing inmit in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Standard results on Bayesian Gaussian learning show that,
conditionally on the past, mit￿1 is normally distributed with mean
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mit and with a variance that depends only on t . Lemma 1 follows
immediately.
2. Wage Formation and Downward Wage Rigidity
The second feature of our framework concerns the process of wage
formation. Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Downward rigidity .—At any date t, the wage of em-
ployee i is given by
w it ￿ max[ψ t(w it￿1), ϕ t(mit)] ￿ αt, (1)
where α t is a random shock and the mappings ψt and ϕt are in-
creasing.
A few comments are in order. Note, first, that wages are assumed
to actually depend on current beliefs: since workers are always free
to quit, the salary received by ‘‘good’’ workers must be high enough
to match the potential offers from other employers. If mit is publicly
observable, at least partially,4 these outside offers must be increasing
in mit.
The rigidity ingredient, on the other hand, is introduced by the
term ψ t(w it￿1) in the max operator: even a very poor performance
cannot drive the current wage below a given function of the past
wage. Such a downward rigidity property is a standard finding of the
empirical literature. Labor sociologists, in particular, have provided
empirical evidence of this effect. Recently, Bewley (1997), after
many interviews with heads and top managers of private firms, has
emphasized the feeling of ‘‘insult’’ that agents associate with a de-
crease in their nominal wages; this argument is put forth by almost
all executives interviewed by Bewley to explain, in particular, why
wages could not be lowered even during recessions.
Finally, αt is some noninsurable random shock. One may think
of α t as a firm-specific demand shock or as stemming from some
bargaining process with unions. Alternatively, αt can be interpreted
as a general inflationary shock. In particular, the formulation in (1)
is compatible with the finding by Baker et al. (1994b) and others
that, although nominal wages generally are downwardly rigid, real
wages need not be in general.
3. Examples
Several models that have been developed in the literature provide
illustrations (and theoretical justifications) of our general frame-
work.
4 For a more complex information setting, see, e.g., Ricart i Costa (1988) and
de Garidel (1997).
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The Harris-Holmstrom model .—A first illustration is provided by the
model of insurance and Bayesian learning proposed by Harris and
Holmstrom (1982). In this framework, the employer is risk neutral
and the worker is risk averse, and it is assumed that no insurance
company covers productivity risks. Wage contracts are then used to
share the risk in an optimal way, under the constraint that the em-
ployee is always free to quit. The learning process is as defined above;
and since commitment is unilateral, the expected value of future
profits, conditional on perceived ability at that time, must be non-
positive at each period.
The solution of the model displays the required downward rigidity
feature. Specifically, Harris and Holmstrom show that the wage re-
ceived by i at date t has the form
w it ￿ max[w it￿1, ϕt(mit)], (2)
where ϕt is a strictly increasing function, the precise form of which
depends on the parameters of the model. The intuition is that, since
information is symmetric, the worker will be insured not only against
the random shocks but also against the risk of being a poor perfor-
mer (having a low η). Thus, at the optimum, no performance can
result in a lowering of wages. Actually, should commitment be bilat-
eral, the contract would provide full insurance, that is, constant
wages independently of performances. Here, however, insurance
can be only partial because of the no-commitment constraint on
the worker’s side. At each period, the worker must face a present
value of future expected wages at least equal to the expected profit
she will generate. The term ϕt(mit) represents precisely the market
value of the employee, as determined by present beliefs about her
ability. Clearly, (2) is a particular case of (1), and Gaussian Bayesian
updating satisfies lemma 1. So the Harris-Holmstrom model does
fit into our general framework.
Incomplete contracts and efficient investments: avoiding ‘‘holdups.’’—
The insurance role of the employment relationship in Harris and
Holmstrom is somewhat controversial. On the one hand, Bils (1985)
finds that, over the business cycle, ‘‘the wages of those who stay at
the same job are only slightly procyclical, but the wages of those who
change jobs and those who move in and out of the work force are
very procyclical’’ (p. 684)—a result that seems to support the insur-
ance story. On the other hand, insurance suggests that the variance
of wages of salaried workers should be much lower than that of self-
employed workers, which is not really supported by the evidence
(see Lazear and Moore 1984).
In any case, insurance is not the only justification for downward
rigidity. In a recent paper, MacLeod andMalcomson (1993) reexam-
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ine the holdup problems raised by incomplete contracting in a
buyer-seller relationship in which unverifiable investments are re-
quired. Their main insight is that the contract cannot generate effi-
cient investment unless the investor receives the full marginal
returns on investment, taking into account any subsequent renegoti-
ation. The authors exhibit simple contracts that achieve this in vari-
ous settings. Most relevant to us is their section 7, in which they
consider a multiperiod model with general investments and a cost
of switching partners. They show that in this model, what they call
a fixed-price contract then induces efficient investments. This con-
tract takes the following form, after renegotiation:
pt ￿ min[max(pt￿1, p St ), p Bt ],
where p Bt (p St ) makes the buyer’s (seller’s) outside option bind (see
fig. 1 in MacLeod and Malcomson). In our case, the buyer is the
employer, the seller is the worker, and p is the wage. Now assume
that the employer’s outside option never binds. Then, while Mac-
Leod and Malcomson’s approach is much more abstract than ours,
the properties of their solution exhibit the type of rigidity that we
assume in assumption 2. If, moreover, the worker’s outside option
is generated by learning and outside offers, then we are back within
the LDR model.
B. The Influence of Early Performances
What are the specific properties of the wage paths under assump-
tions 1 and 2? Some properties are somewhat obvious. For instance,
it can readily be shown that wages should exhibit the so-called fast
track effect: a good start (i.e., a high wage in the first periods) gener-
ally signals a good future career. Thus the wage at date t￿ 1 is always
positively correlated with the wage at date t and, as a matter of fact,
with the wage at any date t ￿ s, s ￿ 0. Note, however, that this is
true only for unconditional distributions: the correlation of the wage
at date t ￿ 1 with the wage at date, say, t ￿ 1, once we also condition
on the wage at date t, is much more complex and will be discussed in
detail below.
A second remark is that, in such a setting, the order in which
performances take place influences the final wage. Downward rigid-
ity indeed generates a ‘‘ratchet’’ effect: whenever a given level of
wage has been reached, future wages will never go below (a function
of) this level, whatever future performances may be. Thus it is always
better to perform well in the first period than later on (see Chiap-
pori, Salanie´, and Valentin [1996] for a formal statement).
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C. Testable Properties of the Wage Process: The Late-
Beginner Effect
We now show that the LDR model implies interesting testable prop-
erties for the optimal wage path. To grasp the intuition, assume that
two workers start at date 0 with identical observable characteristics,
so that they receive the same first-period wage. Then, because of
disparities in performances (due to differences in abilities, luck, or
both), their wages at period 1 differ; say, A’s wage is higher (w A1 ￿
w B1 ). Finally, assume that second-period performances are such that,
at period 2, their wages again are equal. Proposition 1 states that B
then should be expected to have a better future career.
Proposition 1. Assume that A and B are such that w A0 ￿ w B0 ,
w A1 ￿ w B1 , and w A2 ￿ w B2 . Then m A2 ￿ m B2 . In particular, worker B’s
expected wage at date 3 is not worse than A’s:
E[w B3 ￿ w A3 |w A0 ￿ w B0 , w A1 ￿ w B1 , w A2 ￿ w B2 ] ￿ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition can be summarized as follows. Consider B’s perfor-
mance profile. We know that B’s first performance was not as good
as A’s. Also, we know that the order of occurrence matters and that
starting with a bad result is a handicap. But B has still been able to
catch up at period 2. This can be the case only if her average perfor-
mance over the two periods has been at least as good as—and possi-
bly strictly better than—A’s. In the former case, then perceived abili-
ties, and hence expected career profiles, are identical. In the latter
case, A’s perceived ability is lower than B’s; since future prospects
depend only on wage and perceived ability at period 2, we conclude
that B is strictly better off (on average) than A. The latter case is
illustrated in figure 1.
We call this property the late-beginner effect. To the best of our
knowledge, it has not been derived so far as a consequence of any
of the existing alternative models of wage formation. For instance,
in a repeated moral hazard framework, with free access to financial
markets, monetary cost of effort, and constant absolute risk aver-
sion,5 theory shows that optimal incentives can be provided through
memoryless contracts; poor performance today should result in
lower wages tomorrow but then should be forgotten in the future
(see Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom [1990] and Chiappori et
al. [1994] for a general presentation).
5 Models in which agents cannot access a financial market (i.e., cannot save) are
not relevant for the present situation. Moreover, free access to financial markets
with general preferences generates very complex contracts if these contracts are to
be renegotiation-proof (in particular, effort and savings may have to be random-
ized). See Chiappori et al. (1994) for a detailed discussion.
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Fig. 1.—Late-beginner effect
D. Testing for the Late-Beginner Effect
As proposition 1 characterizes the intrinsic dynamics of wages, inde-
pendently of the underlying performances, it can be tested even in
the absence of any data on workers’ performances. Write down (ex-
pected) wages at date t ￿ 1 as a function of observables (age, educa-
tion, etc.) and of wages at both dates t and t ￿ 1. Then the impact
of the wage at date t ￿ 1 should be found negative. Such a test can
be performed on any data set in which wages are observable.
In the real world, however, observed wages do not exactly and
exclusively reflect perceived ability (plus possibly last-period wages
through rigidity). The wage formation process entails more complex
features, such as discrete promotions within a predetermined hierar-
chical structure.
An important strand of the literature on labor contracts, for in-
stance, emphasizes the role of tournaments in the wage-setting pro-
cess (see Green and Stokey 1983). In such a context, wage increases
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actually take the form of discontinuous jumps, often linked with a
promotion to a higher level in the hierarchy. Another argument,
provided byMalcomson (1984), relies on the existence of moral haz-
ard on the employer’s side: a supervisor can always, ex post, underde-
clare the worker’s performance in order to minimize his wage in-
crease. Then promotions provide a simple but efficient commitment
device: the employer can commit on the number of promotions for
a given group, and this is more easily contractible.
This mechanism is especially relevant in our case. Indeed, the exis-
tence of a rigid hierarchical structure, where wage increases system-
atically take the form of promotion to some superior level, is a well-
known characteristic of internal labor markets. Though the rele-
vance of the LDR framework is probably general, one may argue
that the details of the modelization fit the specific context of internal
labor markets especially well. For one thing, other potential employ-
ers are considered in that framework only insofar as they provide
outside opportunities that the agent may and does use in the bar-
gaining process. While this modeling limitation does not raise spe-
cific problems for internal labor markets, it would in the context of
an ‘‘open’’ organization.6 Also, from the empirical point of view, the
assumption of downwardly rigid wages is certainly much more likely
to hold when agents spend their career within the same organiza-
tion.
Of course, testing the late-beginner property on internal labor
markets raises specific difficulties. The main one is that, in this con-
text, wages do not have the same information content as (implicitly)
postulated in the model. They often depend on the hierarchical
level and seniority in a rigid way; in our data set, wages are actually
determined by an explicit formula based on hierarchical level and
seniority within the firm and within the job level. This does not mean
that wages are uncorrelated with ability, but rather that the key infor-
mation is given by the job level, or, in other words, that the dynamics
of wages should be modeled as a discrete process within the hierar-
chical structure. In the remainder of this section, we argue that the
late-beginner effect can still be tested with such data, and we de-
scribe two ways of performing this task.
6 Ricart i Costa (1988) provides an extension of the Harris-Holmstrom framework
to competition between employers. However, this competition typically takes place
under some form of adverse selection, which raises the usual problems of the exis-
tence of an equilibrium. Also, the dynamics of competition in this framework is
particularly complex, as illustrated by de Garidel (1997).
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1. Desired versus Actual Wages
A first solution is to recognize that the wt in the LDR model should
be understood as ‘‘desired’’ wages, whereas actual wages depend on
the hierarchical level, which is observable, according to somemecha-
nism involving other observables (such as seniority). The dynamics
of desired wages are characterized by the same equations as in the
theoretical model above; in particular, they should, accordingly, ex-
hibit the late-beginner effect. But desired wages are not directly ob-
servable from the data; what is observed is the hierarchical level, S t,
that belongs to some finite set ∑ ￿ {S 0, . . . , S k}.7 The level St can
be seen as a discretization of the desired wage in the sense that there
exist thresholds s 1t , . . . , s kt such that
S t ￿ S j ⇔ s jt ￿ wt ￿ s j￿1t . (3)
Now the dynamics of promotions, as recorded in the data, exactly
reflects that of desired wages; we can thus try to estimate the latter
from the former. Once this goal has been reached, testing the late-
beginner effect amounts to testing that
∂
∂wt￿1
E[wt￿1 |wt, wt￿1, X] ￿ 0,
where X denotes a vector of observables.
2. The Dynamics of Promotions
An alternative approach, which follows from Waldman (1984a,
1984b) and Ricart i Costa (1988), is to directly derive, from the set-
ting above, predictions on the promotion mechanism. Assume again
that agents, at any date t, can be assigned a level within some finite
set ∑ ￿ {S 0, . . . , S k}. Suppose, following Gibbons and Waldman
(1998), that each level corresponds to some specific task; in addi-
tion, tasks are increasingly demanding in the sense that a worker’s
productivity is highest in the low job when his expected ability is in
a low range, highest in the middle job when his expected ability is
in a middle range, and so on. Since, within our learning context,
ability cannot be directly observed, but is proxied by average perfor-
mance, the technical translation of this is that there exist thresholds
s 1t , . . . , s kt such that
S t ￿ S j ⇔ s jt ￿ mt ￿
y 1 ￿ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ￿ yt
t
￿ s j￿1t .
7 In what follows, an upper index refers to a level in the hierarchy, whereas a lower
index refers to time.
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Finally, the downward rigidity property can be directly translated in
terms of job levels by imposing that S t ￿ S t ￿ 1 for all t .
It turns out that the late-beginner effect does not always hold in
such a context. To understand why, consider again the situation de-
picted in figure 1, but with a slightly different interpretation. Here,
A was promoted to S 1 at the end of period 1, whereas B remained
at the initial level S 0. After period 2, however, A is still at S 1, and so
is B, who has been able to catch up.
Proposition 1 holds when it is possible to condition on the exact
value of the wage at period 2. By continuity, it still holds when the
wage at period 2 is known with a small enough uncertainty, that is,
when the interval [s 12, s 22], corresponding to level S 1, is narrow
enough. This suggests that the late-beginner effect is more likely to
be satisfied when (i) the lower threshold s 12 is high enough and (ii)
the upper threshold s 22 is low enough.
This claim can be mademore precise (see Chiappori, Salanie´, and
Valentin [1996] for a formal statement), but the intuition is simple.
Assume, first, that all agents are automatically promoted to level 1
at the end of period 2 (this corresponds to s 12 ￿ ￿∞). Then being
a late beginner does not convey any information, except for the fact
that the first performance has been poor. Consequently, expecta-
tions on B will be quite low. On the contrary, if being promoted to
level 1 at the end of period 2 is extremely difficult and requires a
very good average performance, then being a late beginner is a quite
favorable signal. On the other hand, A may have remained at the
same level as a result of good (although not excellent) perfor-
mances; but, alternatively, the reason may entirely be downward ri-
gidity, in spite of a very poor second-period performance. The argu-
ment of proposition 1 then applies: B is likely to perform better in
the future.
A similar remark also applies to the upper threshold s 22. First note
that, in our initial model, a better start is always, unconditionally, a
signal of higher ability. Agents who start fast and continue at the
same pace (the ‘‘champions’’) are likely to be the most productive
overall. On the contrary, the early starters, according to our defini-
tion, are those who started well but experienced a slowdown at the
next stage. For the empirical applications, it is crucial to be able to
distinguish between these two categories. This is precisely the inter-
pretation of the threshold s 22: early starters are characterized by the
fact that their average performance, at the end of period 2, is not
very good; technically, it remains below this threshold. Now, con-
sider, as a third case, the situation in which s 22 is very high—say,
￿∞—so that both champions and early starters are gathered in the
same class. Then proposition 1 does not apply, and the late-beginner
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effect will not hold. The intuition, again, is clear. Worker A’s failure
to be promoted at the end of period 2 has absolutely no informa-
tional content since promotion was basically out of reach by that
time, whatever the performance. The only difference between A and
B is that, while they both reached the same level, A did it earlier.
Then the odds favor A.
It follows that the late-beginner effect is likely to hold when a pro-
motion to level 2 is frequent enough, so that nonpromotion from
level 1 to level 2 signals a relatively weak average performance. Em-
pirically, this will raise problems for the relevant definition of the
‘‘periods’’ under consideration. If period 2 is taken to be very short,
early starters are not singled out from champions, which will contra-
dict the late-beginner effect. But, conversely, if it is too long, then
basically everybody will have been promoted at level 1 by that time,
which also weakens the prediction. We shall discuss this aspect in
more detail in the empirical section.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the two approaches just de-
scribed are not exclusive. On the one hand, from the data on promo-
tions, one can recover the implicit dynamics of desired wages and
check for the negative impact of wages at t ￿ 1 on wages at date
t￿ 1, controlling for wages at date t . On the other hand, the model,
once estimated, allows one to compute the promotion probabilities
conditionally on observables. These probabilities lead to a test of the
kind described just above; in addition, they can be compared to ac-
tual frequencies, which provides an interesting specification test.
This is the path we follow in the empirical sections below.
E. An Alternative Explanation: Human
Capital Accumulation
Before we start the empirical part of the paper, it is worth consider-
ing an alternative explanation for the late-beginner effect that relies
on human capital accumulation (HCA; see Mincer [1974]). Assume
that agents differ by their willingness or ability to accumulate human
capital. Some of them will choose a high-accumulation strategy. In
a first stage, this results in lower wages since part of their effort is
devoted to investment rather than production. But, at the same time,
their capital stock increases quickly. After some time, their produc-
tivity will be boosted by the returns of their capital; wages will then
rise at a much faster pace. Now consider the agents who adopted a
low-accumulation profile. Their wage profile will start with a rela-
tively steeper slope, but this slope will remain more or less constant,
or at least increase in a much slower way. Eventually, agents of the
first category will typically exhibit a late-beginner profile, and the
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model predicts that they will end up with higher wages, just as in
the LDR framework.
However, it is easy to devise an empirical test to distinguish be-
tween the LDR and the HCA explanations of the late-beginner ef-
fect. In the HCA case, agents whose career starts fast accumulate
little human capital, and this lowers their future wages. On the other
hand, we know that in the LDR model, a good start is interpreted
as a signal of a high innate ability and hence predicts high future
wages (this is the ‘‘fast track’’ effect). We shall come back to this
point in the empirical section.
III. The Data
We now turn to the empirical part of the paper. The data set we use
describes the career profiles of a sample of 1,058 executives in a
large French state-owned firm from 1960 to 1982.8
This firm presents the typical attributes of an internal labor mar-
ket. In particular, (1) all executives enter the firm at the same hierar-
chical level; (2) almost all jobs are filled by internal promotion;
(3) quits and layoffs are exceptions; and (4) finally, andmore impor-
tant for our purpose, agents cannot be demoted. This is a provision
of the labor contracts that turns out to be strictly observed since in
our data no demotion is observed over the 15 years.
A. Wage Setting
Wages are determined as a function of job level and seniority. Spe-
cifically, there is an explicit formula, publicly announced, that de-
fines the wage of a given agent as a function of (i) his seniority,
(ii) his hierarchical level, and (iii) a general coefficient At, identical
for all executives, and reflecting the general evolution of purchasing
power; in general, At is bargained over with the unions. Technically,
the internal rules of the firm indicate the following way of comput-
ing wages:
S t ￿ K it ⋅ At. (4)
Here, K it is the wage, as expressed in some internal numeraire
(called ‘‘points’’); then (4) translates the internal numeraire into
francs, using the coefficient At. The value of K it in turn is given by
K it ￿ Li ⋅ (1 ￿ γ it)k it ,
8 For a first investigation on the same data, see Bourguignon and Chiappori
(1990).
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where Li is a coefficient specific to the hierarchical level, γ it depends
only on the employee’s seniority within the firm, and k it depends
only on the employee’s seniority within his current hierarchical
level.
Apparently, this formula was strictly applied. As a matter of fact,
the files we received did not indicate the wage levels at all. When
we asked for them, the answer was that they could be computed from
the formula; we were given a complementary file with the historical
values of the coefficient At over the whole period.
The conclusion is that in this organization, as in most internal
labor markets, wage changes either reflect seniority rules or translate
promotion decisions into monetary terms. The key steps of a career,
in particular, appear to be the transitions between the different hier-
archical levels. Indeed, the analysis of hazard rates by hierarchical
level displays no consistent administrative policy. Thus we consider
promotion as the relevant reward that conveys the employer’s view
of the worker’s ability.9
B. Observables
The data set contains biographical information, such as date of birth
and diploma, and the promotion history, as recorded each year be-
tween 1960 and 1982. Our sample is restricted to agents entering
the firm between 1960 and 1967; as a consequence, we observe the
career of each of them for at least 15 years.
Below we focus on two observable characteristics that are corre-
lated with ability at time of entry, namely, initial training and age at
entry. As amatter of fact, the executives of the sample form a remark-
ably homogeneous population. They are predominantly men (98
percent). Race is not recorded (French law forbids that); neither is
citizenship or geographic origin. None of these variables is likely to
affect promotion for executives in any case. Initial training also is
quite homogeneous, in the sense that all 1,058 executives of the sam-
ple graduated with a masters of engineering and entered the firm
almost immediately. In France, however, not all masters of engi-
neering are equally recognized. A crucial difference, for instance, is
made between Grandes Ecoles10 and alternative university programs
that deliver an equivalent degree. In addition, there is also an impor-
9 Another point is that, throughout the period, the real wage never declined, in
contrast with the findings of Baker et al. (1994b). This probably reflects the strong
bargaining position of unions in this particular context.
10 TheGrandes Ecoles are the most prestigious source of young executives in France.
Wage surveys show that their diplomas strongly affect a beginner’s value on the labor
market.
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.148 on Tue, 3 Mar 2015 12:11:23 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
746 journal of political economy
Fig. 2.—Number of promotions by diploma
tant dispersion between the Grandes Ecoles . Following most empirical
work on similar data, we divided the sample into two classes: the
best-known Grandes Ecoles and the other diplomas. One can observe
this dispersion when looking at the total number of promotions a
worker gets at the end of the first 15 years in the firm. Figure 2
displays the percentage of the sample who obtained from one to six
promotions at the end of the period of observation.
The other explanatory variable is the age at entry in the firm. This
varies between 21 and 32, with a mode at 26.
C. Defining the Periods
The late-beginner property involves three subperiods, so we shall
need to split the data accordingly. This, of course, is an important
part of the empirical work since it relates to the construction of the
specific data set used to test for the late-beginner effect.
During their careers, the executives are promoted along a fixed
hierarchical scheme. Concerning the first 15 years, four levels of the
scale are in fact relevant: they are classified as 10, 11, 12, and 13.
Every worker starts at the bottom of level 10 in his first year of em-
ployment. All but a very small minority (less than 3 percent) are at
level 13 or below after 15 years. So the first promotion we consider
(which may or may not occur during period 1) occurs from level
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10 to level 11. Among those promoted early to level 11, some (the
‘‘champions’’) are then promoted to level 12 during the next pe-
riod, whereas others (our ‘‘early starters’’) are not. Also, among the
rest, some (our ‘‘late beginners’’) are promoted to level 11 (or even
to level 12) during the second period, whereas others are not. Fi-
nally, we can consider later promotions (to level 13 or above) during
the last period.
The next step is to precisely define the periods. Our raw data set
spans the first 15 years of every worker’s career. Thus, a priori, there
is a lot of leeway to break the 15 years into three periods. The end
of the third period will be the end of the last year. But when should
the first and second periods end?
A basic guideline is suggested by the conclusions of the theory
section. On the one hand, each period must be long enough for
promotions to happen ‘‘often,’’ so that the downward rigidity phe-
nomenon has time to appear (and, incidentally, that the samples
are of sufficient size for the empirical conclusions to be statistically
significant). On the other hand, during longer periods, most work-
ers will be promoted, and promotion may lose most of its informa-
tion content, as discussed above. This remark is especially important
in the case of period 2. We want the number of promotions from
level 11 to level 12 to be nonnegligible in order to distinguish our
early starters from the best performers overall (the champions).
There is, however, a price to pay for that: promotions from level 10
to level 11 may then concern a majority of the agents at stake, which
somewhat blurs the distinction between our late beginners and the
worst performers overall. The nature of this trade-off is essentially
empirical; a closer look at the data is needed at this point.
A key empirical element to be considered, hence, is the promo-
tion probability per year at each level. Figure 3 indicates, for each
possible tenure, the percentage of the total population at each level.
These are descriptive statistics; no correction has been made for
truncation. Let us first consider level 10. Less than one-fourth of the
sample was promoted before year 3; conversely, almost 90 percent
had been promoted at year 5. This strongly suggests that the first
period should last 3 or 4 years.
Let us now consider the second period. After 6 years, only 10 per-
cent of the total population has been promoted to level 12; the corre-
sponding agents are almost exclusively champions, that is, agents
following the fast tracks. Period 2, hence, should end at least at year
7, and preferably 8 or 9. Going beyond 9, on the other hand, is
excluded because the population remaining at level 10 after that
date is too small (about 1 percent of the population).
The conclusion is that, given the requirements previously de-
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Fig. 3.—Empirical probability of promotion by tenure
scribed, period 1 can reasonably be taken to end 3 or 4 years after
entry into the firm, whereas for period 2, year 7, 8, or 9 seems accept-
able. In the section on descriptive statistics below, we consider the
various combinations and indicate their consequences. As for the
econometric estimation, on the other hand, we select the intermedi-
ate definitions, that is, respectively, 4 years and 8 years.
In each case, we define
Y1 ￿ ￿1 if the worker was promoted to level 11 inthe first period0 otherwise;
Y2 ￿ ￿
2 if the worker was promoted to level 12 during
the first two periods
1 if the worker was promoted to level 11 but not to
level 12 during the first two periods
0 otherwise;
Y3 ￿ ￿3 if the worker was promoted to level 13 orabove before the end of the 15 years2 otherwise.
Finally, our explanatory variables Xi refer to age and education.
These are dichotomic variables. The variable X i1 takes the value one
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X i1 0 1
0 29.7 30.7
1 18.2 21.4
when worker i has a diploma from one of the top Grandes Ecoles and
zero otherwise; X i2 takes the value one when the worker was recruited
before reaching his twenty-sixth birthday and zero otherwise. The
cutoff age of 26 was chosen because it splits the sample about evenly.
Table 1 shows how the sample splits among the resulting four catego-
ries. In order to control for possible changes during the period, we
also added a third dummy variable that takes the value one for em-
ployees who were hired after 1964 (the midpoint in the sample).
IV. Descriptive Statistics
Given our data, it is easy to test the late-beginner effect using only
descriptive statistics. For any given definition of periods, denote pijk
the true probability that a worker has the promotion path (Y1 ￿ i,
Y2 ￿ j, Y3 ￿ k) and Nijk the number of such workers in our data set.
Then early starters are clearly those for whom Y1 ￿ Y2 ￿ 1, so that
their conditional promotion probability in the third period is
p 113/p 11. On the other hand, there are two possible ways to define
the late beginners. The first one consists in selecting those workers
for whom Y1￿ 0 and Y2￿ 1. Then the late-beginner effect translates,
in terms of conditional promotion probabilities, into p 013/p 01 ￿
p 113/p 11. Let us call this inequality I1. The conditional probabilities
on both sides of the inequality can be estimated by their empirical
analogues N 013/N 01 and N 113/N 11; the standard errors of these esti-
mators follow by assuming a binomial process, and finally we can
compute the Student of the difference of the two conditional proba-
bilities if we make the further (natural) assumption that their estima-
tors are independent.
To illustrate this, we use the whole sample of 1,058 executives and
consider various possible definitions for the first two periods. In each
case, we estimate the ratios N 013/N 01 and N 113/N 11 and the Student
of the difference. The results are given in table 2.
When the second period ends 8 or 9 years after entry, the compari-
son of conditional promotion probabilities is consistent with our pre-
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TABLE 2
Promotion Probabilities for Early Starters and Late Beginners
(with Inequality I1)
Promotion Probability
Definition t-Test for the
of Periods Late Beginners Early Starters Difference
t 1 ￿ 3, t 2 ￿ 7 .31 (.02) .35 (.04) ￿.90
t 1 ￿ 4, t 2 ￿ 7 .30 (.03) .34 (.03) ￿.97
t 1 ￿ 3, t 2 ￿ 8 .23 (.02) .17 (.04) 1.18
t 1 ￿ 4, t 2 ￿ 8 .22 (.02) .21 (.03) .32
t 1 ￿ 3, t 2 ￿ 9 .12 (.02) .07 (.04) 1.10
t 1 ￿ 4, t 2 ￿ 9 .11 (.02) .10 (.03) .18
diction: late beginners are more likely to reach the top than early
starters. It is not the case, however, when the second period is
shorter (i.e., 7 years). Seven years may not be long enough for down-
ward rigidity to operate, as argued above. In any case, the differences
are not statistically significant.
These results, however, are somewhat biased by the fact that at
the end of the second period, some of the late beginners are already
at the next level (i.e., level 12; this corresponds to Y1 ￿ 0 and Y2 ￿
2). These workers are not taken into account in the statistics above.
Still, they provide an even better illustration of our late-beginner
effect: typically, their ability is high, although they have been espe-
cially unlucky during the first period. Table 3 presents the promo-
tion probabilities when this particular subsample is added to the
late-beginner population so that the conditional promotion proba-
bility of late beginners now is defined as (p 013 ￿ p 023)/(p 01 ￿ p 02).
We call the resulting inequality I2.
TABLE 3
Promotion Probabilities for Early Starters and Late Beginners
(with Inequality I2)
Promotion Probability
Definition t-Test for the
of Periods Late Beginners Early Starters Difference
t 1 ￿ 3, t 2 ￿ 7 .40 (.02) .35 (.04) 1.1
t 1 ￿ 4, t 2 ￿ 7 .34 (.02) .34 (.03) .0
t 1 ￿ 3, t 2 ￿ 8 .39 (.02) .17 (.04) 4.7
t 1 ￿ 4, t 2 ￿ 8 .33 (.02) .21 (.03) 3.0
t 1 ￿ 3, t 2 ￿ 9 .38 (.02) .07 (.04) 7.0
t 1 ￿ 4, t 2 ￿ 9 .32 (.02) .10 (.03) 6.0
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Now the differences of probabilities always have the predicted
sign; in addition, for t 2 ￿ 8 and t 2 ￿ 9, they are highly significant.
This suggests that the predictions of the theoretical model are at
least worth more precise consideration. In the next section, we im-
pose more structure on the data-generating process in order to
reach sharper results.
V. The Econometric Model
Our general strategy in this section is the one described at the end
of Section II. We first specify a desired wage formation equation that
can be estimated from our promotion data. A first test concerns the
predicted negative correlation between wages at dates 1 and 3. Then,
using the estimated model, we can estimate the conditional promo-
tion probabilities and directly check the late-beginner effect.
The first task, hence, is to specify the equations for the desired
wages wt. We proceed as follows. First, we subtract the effect of ob-
servables:Wt￿ wt￿ Xδ, where δ is a set of time-invariant parameters
to be estimated. Second, conditionally on observables, the first-
period desired wage should depend on the realization of the first-
period performance:
W1 ￿ α1 ￿ u ￿ ￿1, (5)
where ￿1 is the first period’s random shock and u is a random fixed
effect.
What we want to test now is a prediction on the expected value
of the desired wage at date t ￿ 1, conditionally on its values at dates
t and t ￿ 1. This suggests the following decomposition:
W2 ￿ E[W2 |W1] ￿ (W2 ￿ E[W2 |W1]),
W3 ￿ E[W3 |W1, W2] ￿ (W3 ￿ E[W3 |W1, W2]).
(6)
Given the complexity of the estimation process (it will rely on a
trivariate probit model), we consider a linearization of both condi-
tional expectations E[W2 |W1] and E[W3 |W1,W2]. Then (6) takes the
form
W2 ￿ α2 ￿ β2W1 ￿ ￿2,
W3 ￿ α3 ￿ β3W2 ￿ γ3W1 ￿ ￿3,
(7)
where, by construction, ￿2 is independent from u and ￿1, and ￿3 is
independent from u, ￿1, and ￿2.
The prediction to be tested is that β2 ￿ 0, β3 ￿ 0, and γ3 ￿ 0.
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Finally, (5) and (6) give the following equations for the desired
wages:
w 1 ￿ c 1 ￿ Xδ ￿ u ￿ ￿1,
w 2 ￿ c 2 ￿ Xδ ￿ β2(u ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿2, (8)
w 3 ￿ c 3 ￿ Xδ ￿ β3[β2(u ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿2] ￿ γ3(u ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿3.
Given that we shall use a trivariate probit model, there is little we
can do to estimate the variances of the disturbances. Thus we nor-
malize the variances of u ￿ ￿1 and u ￿ ￿2 to one. This decomposes
into Vu￿ ρ and V￿1￿ V￿2￿ 1￿ ρ. Note that ρ is a crucial parameter
since it represents the variance of the random fixed effect and, thus,
what is to be learned about the worker’s ability. On the other hand,
since the third period is longer than each of the first two periods,
we allow for a different variance for ￿3: V￿3 ￿ v 3(1 ￿ ρ) so that both
ρ and v 3 are to be estimated.
Finally, we observe only the job level, interpreted as a discretiza-
tion of the desired wage. Our dependent variables, hence, are de-
fined as





2 if w2 ￿ s 22
1 if s 12 ￿ w2 ￿ s 22
0 otherwise;
(9)




with only one proviso due to downward rigidity: since there are
no demotions in the sample, we code Y2 ￿ 1 whenever Y1 ￿ 1 and
w 2 ￿ s 12.
Our model is defined by (8) and (9) plus the requirement that
u, ￿1, ￿2, and ￿3 are centered normal and independently distributed,
with the variances given above. The constants c i and α i cannot be
estimated independently of the thresholds, so we shall not try to
interpret them. There are eight other parameters to be estimated:
three in δ, β2, β3, γ3, ρ, and v 3.
We are now ready to write our trivariate probit model. Note that
because of the coefficients β2, β3, and γ3 and the correlation struc-
ture they induce among (w 1, w 2, w 3), the model does not decompose
across periods: it is formally similar to a probit model on panel data
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with serial correlation. The likelihood function for the full sample














1(Y i1 ￿ j)1(Y i2 ￿ k)1(Y i3 ￿ l )p ijkl
and N ￿ 1,058 is the number of workers in our sample.
The computation of the probabilities p ijkl is tedious but simple.
Take, for instance, the probability p i002 that worker i is never pro-
moted. This is just the probability that
u i ￿ ￿i1 ￿ s 11 ￿ c 1 ￿ X iδ,
β2(ui ￿ ￿ i1) ￿ ￿i2 ￿ s 12 ￿ c 2 ￿ X iδ,
β3[β2(ui ￿ ￿ i1) ￿ ￿i2] ￿ γ3(ui ￿ ￿i1) ￿ ￿i3 ￿ s 13 ￿ c 3 ￿ X iδ.
All left-hand terms in this system of inequalities are centered nor-
mal, and it is easy to compute their variance-covariance matrix, so
that p i002 is easily expressed using Φ3, the cumulative distribution
function of a trivariate normal vector with zero mean, unit variance,
and arbitrary correlations. The function CDFTVN of the GAUSS
software is a very accurate (if somewhat slow) implementation of the
trivariate normal cumulative distribution function Φ3.
It is readily checked that the likelihood function depends on ex-
actly eight parameters (the constants are discarded), so that the
model is just identified. While the expression for LN looks forbid-
ding, it can be computed and maximized fairly easily with GAUSS.
This yields consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators ￿ˆN of
the parameter vector ￿ ￿ (ρ, β2, β3, γ3, δ, v 3). Their asymptotic vari-
ance-covariance matrix is consistently estimated by Iˆ ￿1, where Iˆ is





∂ log l i
∂￿
(￿ˆN)
∂ log l i
∂￿ʹ′
(￿ˆN).
These estimators can be tested for the theoretical restrictions on
β2, β3, and γ3; they also will give us immediately the conditional
probabilities of promotion at the third period that we are most in-
terested in.
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TABLE 4
Estimated Parameters and Their Students
Parameter Estimated Student
ρ (variance of fixed effect) .46 3.8
β2 ￿ ∂W2/∂W1 .67 8.6
β3 ￿ ∂W3/∂W2 1.02 8.1
γ ￿ ∂W3/∂W1 ￿.30 ￿3.4
δ1 (top diploma) .78 9.6
δ2 (young at entry) ￿.34 ￿5.1
δ3 (late entry) .19 2.9
v 3 (third-period variance) 1.03 4.1
VI. The Results
Maximizing the log likelihood yielded the estimates11 contained in
table 4. The algorithm converged without difficulty.12
First note that a high-level diploma increases the probability of
a promotion; as expected, this effect is strongly significant. Age at
recruitment also appears to have a positive effect on perceived abil-
ity; again, anecdotal evidence seems to confirm this. The value of δ3
suggests either that the quality of newly hired executives improved
slightly after 1964 or that demand factors created better opportuni-
ties from that date on. More interesting, the estimated variance of
the individual random effect ρ implies that the individual random
effect contributes about half the variance of the shock on each pe-
riod’s performance. This confirms that learning about innate abili-
ties should be a central preoccupation of employers.
The key prediction of the LDR model is that, owing to the late-
beginner effect, γ3 should be negative; this is clearly corroborated by
the data. Also note that the coefficients β2 and β3 have the expected
positive sign.
Recall from the descriptive section that we had two ways to test








which we called inequality I1. Of course, these probabilities here
depend on the individual through his (age, education, year of entry)
11 We do not present estimates for the constants and thresholds since they are not
identifiable.
12 It took about an hour on a Pentium microcomputer. Most of the CPU time is
spent inside the trivariate normal cumulative distribution function CDFTVN.
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X 1 X 2 X 3 (1) (2) (3)
0 0 0 .21 .19 .5
0 0 1 .24 .22 .7
0 1 0 .16 .16 .1
0 1 1 .19 .18 .3
1 0 0 .34 .29 1.3
1 0 1 .37 .32 1.4
1 1 0 .28 .25 .9
1 1 1 .31 .27 1.1
characteristics. Table 5 shows that the hypothesis is indeed con-
firmed for all ages, education levels, and subperiods of entry. We
also computed the estimated standard errors of (p 013/p 01) ￿
(p 113/p 11) using Slutsky’s theorem. In each case, the late-beginner
effect is satisfied, although the estimated Student t Δ in column 3 of
table 5 shows that the difference is never statistically significant at
the conventional 5 percent level.
It turns out that our second way to test the late-beginner effect
(using inequality I2) yields similar but much more clear-cut results.
Recall that in this test we also consider those who were not promoted
in the first period but were promoted twice in the second period as
late beginners, so that the conditional promotion probability of late
beginners now is (p 013 ￿ p 023)/(p 01 ￿ p 02). The results are given in






X 1 X 2 X 3 (1) (2) (3)
0 0 0 .31 .19 3.3
0 0 1 .35 .22 3.7
0 1 0 .23 .16 2.5
0 1 1 .27 .18 2.9
1 0 0 .50 .29 4.7
1 0 1 .55 .32 4.8
1 1 0 .41 .25 4.2
1 1 1 .46 .27 4.5
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TABLE 7
Actual vs. Simulated Promotion Paths
Simulated
Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 Actual (Rounded)
0 0 2 10 10
0 0 3 0 0
0 1 2 265 267
0 1 3 76 74
0 2 2 21 20
0 2 3 64 65
1 1 2 142 140
1 1 3 38 39
1 2 2 103 104
1 2 3 339 338
of the observables; but this time the difference is always statistically
significant.
Thus table 5 and especially table 6 systematically back the hypothe-
sis that late beginners are favored in the third period, which we de-
rived as an implication of the LDR model. This clearly suggests that
learning about innate abilities is a strongly relevant factor in de-
termining career profiles. It also emphasizes the surprising pre-
dictive power of such a simple model as that in LDR.
It is difficult to invent a specification test since no simple and at-
tractive alternative specification comes to mind. However, it is easy
to look at the fit of the model by comparing the promotion paths
simulated from the estimated models and those found in the actual
sample. This is done in table 7. The results show that, simple as it
is, our model predicts promotion paths very accurately.
VII. Conclusion
The first goal of the paper was to show how the dynamical conse-
quences of a wage contracting model can lead to testable restrictions
on career profiles. We identified a class of models that generate a
‘‘late-beginner’’ property. Our empirical results confirm this predic-
tion, as we find that late beginners are systematically favored in fu-
ture promotion decisions.
A natural question at this point is whether other types of models
would also predict a late-beginner type of effect. We shall review a
few candidates here and indicate which empirical consideration
could be used to distinguish them from the LDR class of models.
Let us first deal briefly with the first two alternative explanations.
The first one rests on the famous Peter principle, which holds that
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every worker is promoted up to his or her level of incompetence.
The trouble with this approach is that it finds it difficult to account
for the mere existence of late beginners whose career stagnates and
then accelerates. The second explanation holds that recent perfor-
mance could be a better indicator of future success because future
work is more closely related to recent than to past work. This would
ignore the fact that, in our framework, early starters and late begin-
ners were not employed at the same task at the beginning of the
first period; in fact, early starters were employed at a higher job level.
We now consider in more detail two other possible stories.
A. Human Capital Accumulation
We first consider the HCA story. As argued in the theory section,
there exists a very simple test that allows one to decide between the
two explanations. If differences in HCA strategies are the main cause
of the observed differences in career profiles, then it should be the
case that, unconditionally, a slow start leads to better careers than a
quick one.
Two types of evidence can be put forth to check this property. For
one thing, we can consider the subset of agents who turned out to
be the most successful and see what their initial wage profile looked
like. Our data clearly favor the LDR interpretation. For instance,
among the 517 agents (out of 1,058) who reached the top levels in
the third period, only 140 (i.e., 27 percent) were not promoted dur-
ing the first period (our definition of a ‘‘slow start’’). This feature
appears to be fairly robust: a slow start is, unconditionally, correlated
with a lower terminal position. This ‘‘fast track’’ effect is of course
very well known in the literature, and there is little need to insist
on it.
Going forward this time, we can also test whether a slow start is,
unconditionally, correlated with a higher terminal position. Again,
the answer is clearly negative. Take, for instance, the proportion of
executives who eventually made it to job level 13 as a function of
their start. Among the best starters (the champions: Y1 ￿ 1 and Y2
￿ 2), the proportion is above 75 percent, whereas it is only 21 per-
cent for those with a relatively fast start (Y1 ￿ 1 and Y2 ￿ 1); finally,
none of the executives with a really slow start (the worst performers
overall: Y1 ￿ 0 and Y2 ￿ 0) did it. Restricting attention to only two
periods does not change this conclusion; for instance, we find that
N 12
N 1
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and the difference is highly significant (the Student of the difference
is 9.9).
We conclude that the HCA explanation can be rejected. It should
be stressed, however, that this conclusion does not imply that agents
do not accumulate human capital, but simply that differences in the
respective rates of human capital accumulation do not seem to pro-
vide a convincing explanation of the late-beginner effect.
B. Autocorrelated Individual Productivity
A second possible explanation relies on specific properties of the
dynamics of individual productivity. Assume that wages are directly
linked to productivity, say, w it￿ φ(γ it), where γ it denotes i ’s productiv-
ity at date t and φ is increasing. Also, assume that productivity follows
some AR(2) process:




t￿2 ￿ ν t . (11)
Assume, finally, that β ￿ 0. It may be, for instance, that changes in
productivity are positively correlated across time, say
γ it ￿ γ
i
t￿1 ￿ λ(γ it￿1 ￿ γ it￿2) ￿ ν t ,
with λ￿ 0 (in which case α￿ 1￿ λ and β ￿￿λ); but other illustra-
tions could be found.
This, quite obviously, would lead to exactly the kind of effect we
get in our model. This suggests a couple of remarks.
A formulation like (11) is both more specific and more ad hoc
than our setting. The key point—the negative correlation between
γ it and γ it￿2, with γ it￿1 kept constant—has to be postulated rather than
derived from a set of theoretical assumptions. Also, while autocorre-
lation of productivity shocks may sound like an acceptable assump-
tion, it may be more difficult to understand why productivity changes
should be positively correlated. Note, incidentally, that the AR(2)
structure is needed; an AR(1) process would not produce a late-
beginner effect.
In principle, the existence of an AR(2) structure with a negative
β is a testable assumption. Unfortunately, in our case, this test is
difficult to achieve because of the discrete nature of our data. In any
case, it would require more than three periods, which would add
further difficulties for the estimation. Data on wages, such as those
used by Baker et al. (1994a, 1994b), would be more adequate. Obvi-
ously, further research is needed in this area.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Since w B2 ￿ w A2 , we know that
max[ψ2(w B1 ), ϕ2(m B2 )] ￿ α2 ￿ max[ψ2(w A1 ), ϕ2(m A2 )] ￿ α2 .
A first consequence is that
w B2 ￿ ϕ2(m B2 ) ￿ α2 ￿ ψ2(w B1 ) ￿ α2 . (A1)
Indeed, assume that
w B2 ￿ ψ2(m B1 ) ￿ α2 .
Then
ψ2(w B1 ) ￿ α2 ￿ ψ2(w A1 ) ￿ α2 ,
which implies w B1 ￿ w A1 , a contradiction. Now
w A2 ￿ max[ψ2(w A1 ), ϕ2(m A2 )] ￿ α2 ￿ ϕ2(m A2 ) ￿ α2 . (A2)
From (A1) and (A2) it follows that ϕ2(m A2 )￿ ϕ2(m B2 ). Since ϕ2 is increasing,
this implies
m A2 ￿ m B2 . (A3)
Finally, for i ￿ A, B, we have
E[w i3 |y i1, y i2] ￿ E[max[ψ3(w i2), ϕ3(mi3)] |y i1, y i2]
￿ E[max[ψ3(w i2), ϕ3(mi3)] |mi2]
from lemma 1. Then (A3) implies that
E[w B3 |y B1 , y B2 ] ￿ E[w A3 |y A1 , y A2 ].
Q.E.D.
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